Abstract. The rapid growth of online search and its centrality to the ecology of the Internet raise many questions for economists to answer: Why is the search engine market so concentrated and will it evolve towards monopoly? What implications does this concentration have for consumers, search engines, and advertisers? Does search require regulation and if so in what form? This paper supplies empirical and theoretical material with which to examine these questions. In particular, we (a) show that the already large levels of concentration are likely to continue (b) identify the consequences, negative and positive, of this outcome (c) discuss the regulatory interventions that policy-makers could use to address these.
Introduction
Internet search (or perhaps more accurately 'web-search') has grown enormously in recent years, rising in line, or even faster, than the general development of the Internet and the World-Wide-Web.
1 Beginning from practically nothing twelve years ago, today search is a multi-billion dollar business. Search engine providers such as Google and Yahoo! have become household names 2 and use of a search engine, like use of the Web, is now a part of everyday life.
As the amount of information pouring onto the web has grown, the utility, importance, and power of search engines has grown concomitantly: with ever more information available, a user is faced with finding a 'needle' in an ever larger 'haystack' -and has therefore become ever more dependent on the filtering facilities provided by search engines. With this process of information accumulation showing little sign of slowing, let alone stopping, the continued growth of search engines, and their importance, seems assured.
Apart from its wider societal importance there are several noteworthy features of the search engine business. Most importantly, the fact that users (almost always) do not pay -that is to say, the service provided by web search engines are free (to use). 3 Where then do web search engines find their revenue? In one word: advertising. When search engines provide ordinary users with a 'free' service they gain something very valuable in exchange:
attention. Attention is a rival good, and one in strictly limited supply -after all each of us have a maximum of 24 hours of attention available in any one day (and usually much, much less). Access to that attention is correspondingly valuable -and is likely to become ever more so -especially for those who have products or services to advertise. Thus, while web search engines do not charge users, they can retail the attention generated by their service to those are willing to pay for access to it. In so doing such companies have built multi-billion dollar businesses.
It is also now noteworthy, that the skills and resources acquired in developing the basic search engine, particularly the skills in optimizing the selection of advertising to show, are now proving valuable outside of their original context. For example, by quarter two 2007, 35% of Google's total revenue ($1.35 billion) came from provision of advertising on 3rd party sites via its Adsense programme while 64% ($2.49 billion) of its revenue came from sites it owned and operated. 4 Similarly, in the same time period, 35% of Yahoo's total revenue ($599 million of $1,698 million) came from affiliates while just over 52% of its revenue ($887 million) came from sites it owns and operates.
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Another major feature of the search engine market is its high levels of concentration.
As of August 2007 the top four search engines had a combined market share 97% in the US with the top firm (Google) having 65%.
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The rapid growth of online search, its concentration and its growing centrality to our societies raise a variety of important questions for economists to answer. Why is the search engine market so concentrated? Will concentration increase or decrease over time, This article addresses several of these questions. We begin in section 2 with a brief history of Internet search which provides the basic background for what follows. Those already familiar with this material, or who wish to get straight to the more 'economic' results, may safely skip this section. In section 3 we provide empirical evidence on the levels of concentration in the search engine market, both over time and across jurisdictions. Additionally web search provides a fascinating case study for a student of technology and innovation. After all web search is clearly a new product, and one which is developing and evolving rapidly, with very large R&D spends by the major players.
This data clearly shows that the search engine market is indeed highly concentrated and has grown more so over time. Sections 4, 5 and 6 form the core of the paper. In section 4
we introduce a basic model of the search engine market and use it in section 5 to explain why the search engine market is so concentrated -and likely to grow even more so. In addition, we discuss in detail the question of contestability -that is whether the market might remain competitive (contestable) even if one firm were very dominant. We suggest that there are a variety of reasons why, even if one thinks the market is contestable now, it is likely to grow less so over time.
This motivates the second piece of theoretical analysis in section 6. Building on the framework of the previous sections we introduce social welfare and use it to analyze the performance of a monopolist. We show that monopoly can result in either over-provision or under-provision of quality relative to the social optimum. However, as we discuss, there are various reasons why it is more likely that under-provision occurs. In particular, we identify two particular effects, 'substitution' (organic results substitute for paid ones) and 'antagonism' (organic results may provide information that deter people from using paid ones), which both unambiguously operate to reduce the monopoly-provided level of quality compared to the socially optimal one.
This conclusion that a monopolist is likely to under-provide quality -whether relative to the social optimum or a more competitive environment -leads naturally into the last section of the paper which discusses possible actions to address this deficiency. We argue that the evidence on increasing concentration and the theoretical results earlier in the paper suggest that some form of intervention is needed. However, the informational and legal difficulties of direct regulation are substantial. We therefore focus on the indirect approaches a policy-maker could take. Among other things, we point out that search engines have a natural division into 'service' and 'software' sections, with large competitive and technological differences between the two (in particular, the former has much greater resemblance to a natural monopoly than the latter). This suggests analogies with experience in other utility markets such as telecoms and electricity where a similar upstream/downstream division have proved useful in the design of regulatory intervention.
1.1. Related Literature. Much related work, particularly in theoretical areas, is discussed later in the paper in the modelling sections. Nevertheless, we briefly discuss here some of the wider context in which this work is situated.
The majority of the existing literature focuses on the advertising side of search engines. For example there is significant work on ad-auctions, e.g. Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007) ; Varian (2007) , work on seller's strategies in an online, search-based environment, see e.g. Ellison and Ellison (2004) , work on the impact of advertising ('paidplacement', 'sponsored-results' etc) on facilitating (or hindering) consumer search, see e.g. Chen and He (2006) ; Athey and Ellison (2007) ; White (2008) .
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With their focus on advertising many of of these papers see Internet search as some form of improved 'yellow-pages'. 9 In particular, search engines are seen primarily a way for consumers to find commercial services or products they want. This contrasts with the approach taken here where 'organic' results are primary with 'paid' or 'sponsored' links secondary -at least for users. 10 Of course, search engines pay for providing the quality of their 'organic' results using money gained from 'sponsored ones' and hence the two parts are, in may ways, symbiotic. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the major benefits generated by search engines are in connecting people with information from which no commercial transaction is likely to result -at least in the near-term. 11 This point will be central to our analysis and it is this focus, together with the explicit attention we give to questions on market structure and welfare, which differentiate our analysis from much of this existing literature.
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8 Most of these papers are theoretical but there is also growing amount of empirical work, see e.g. Ghose and Yang (2007) ; Goldfarb and Tucker (2007) . 9 See Baye and Morgan (2001) for an early paper analyzing a 'yellow-pages' (information-gatekeeper) type model in an online environment. This type of work also connects directly into the much larger traditional literature on consumer search. 10 This ordering also reflects the initial development of search engines themselves in which 'pure' search came first. 11 One could argue that all search has some impact on commercial activities over the long-term -and clearly not all advertising is directed at stimulating purchases right now. However, in most cases, this connection is so tenuous that we feel it can be ignored. 12 There has been a very limited work on areas more directly related to ours, particularly on issues of market share. Gandal (2001) , did (very) early empirical work which examined changes in market share in the late 1990s. Similarly, Telang, Mukhopadhyay, and Rajan (2004) also looked at market share, though from a theoretical perspective and try to explain the persistence of low-quality firms in a market where prices are zero.
A Brief History of Web Search
The history of web search is inextricably bound up with the development of the world wide web. We therefore begin with a brief sketch that outlines the nature and history of the Web before turning to the question of search. what that user is looking for -for example if the user has queried for "shoes" we can be fairly certain the user is interested in shoes (and may even be interested in buying some).
As a result, a search-engine can dramatically increase the relevance of the advertisements it displays -in a very similar way to the manner in which it uses the user's query to select the 'normal' search results -and increased relevance of course means increased value to those who wish to advertise.
This idea in itself is fairly old. For example, its underlies all 'Yellow Pages', and almost all advertising will take some account of audience segmentation (after all advertisements in 'Autocar' are likely to reach a different set of people from those in 'Vogue'). 20 Nevertheless, the realization of the particular value offered by search queries, and its general introduction to the online environment, is generally credited to Bill Gross and the company he started to exploit it: GoTo.com. 20 And, of course, the use of general demographic information to target product information has not only continued in the digital, online world but grown dramatically -largely thanks to the increased ability to record and process information about users. It is this pool of highly specific information about users (including complete information about their friendship/acquaintance network) that makes social sites such as Facebook so attractive to advertisers and so (potentially) valuable to their operators. 21 GoTo.com in turn became Overture in October 2001, which after acquiring Altavista early 2003, was itself finally bought by Yahoo! later that year. 22 Note that Google had launched simple 'text-banner' adverts at the top of their search results back at the end of 1999 -and were one of the last companies to do so (see Search Engine Watch's Search Engine Report from Dec. 6 1999). However it was with the launch of the Adwords service that the possibilities of paid inclusion were first fully appreciated -and exploited. Regarding this service it is noteworthy that Overture (the successor of GoTo.com) alleged that it infringed on one of their patents (US patent 6269361) and began proceedings against Google in April 2002 (http://www.news.com/2100-1023-876861.html). This dispute was finally settled in 2004 (after Overture's acquisition by Yahoo!) with Google issuing 2.7 million shares of common stock to Yahoo! (http://www.news.com/Google,-Yahoo!-bury-the-legal-hatchet/ 2100-1024_3-5302421.html).
23 Google, along with many other participants, use a form of generalized second-value auction. Apparently this was initially adopted simply for performance and usability reasons (a first-value auction would result in users continually 'logging-in' to check their position and shave their bid). However, research since then, see e.g. Varian (2007); Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007) , has demonstrated several attractive properties from a purely auction-theoretical perspective. Given the combination of active use (literally 'billions of dollars' worth of keywords auctioned) and the theoretical challenges in analysing what are, in effect, large dynamic auctions of multiple goods (consisting of both substitutes and complements) it is likely that this area will remain a fertile area of investigation for auction economists and others in the years to come. 
Concentration in the Search Engine Market: The Data
As already mentioned, one of the most noteworthy aspects of the search market is the very high levels of concentration already evident. Table 3 gives data from Autumn 2007 on the share of major search engines in several different countries. As can be seen, the C 4 values (the combined market share of the top 4 firms) are over 90% in all jurisdictions except Hong Kong. 24 Even more significantly, in all cases except Hong Kong, the market share of the largest operator is substantially larger than its nearest competitor, and in the UK and Australia this dominance has reached the point where the largest operator (Google) has over 80% of the market -a level an order of magnitude higher than its nearer competitor.
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Also interesting is the question of how market shares have evolved over time. Obtaining good (comparable) market share data over a reasonable stretch of time is not easy. In particular, in the late 90s and early 2000s the only information recorded was the number of visits to a particular website. Since many providers of search also ran 'portals' it can be difficult to distinguish pure search from simple visits. In addition, early data frequently only records the number of unique visitors a month rather than giving a breakdown of the number of hits and this can severely distort results since pure-search providers (such 24 It may be useful here to compare recent data from China which put Baidu at over 60%, with Google in second place at around 26% and Yahoo! third at around 10% implying a C4 ≥ C3 = 96% (see http://blog.searchenginewatch.com/blog/080229-230636).
25 Perhaps even more significantly, Google's market share among younger users (University and High School) is even greater: over 90% according to Hitslink (http://marketshare.hitslink.com/articles.aspx, retrieved 2008-03-10). Compared to the 60% figure estimated for the overall US market this indicates a much, much higher level of concentration among the future user population than among the present one. Should these high market shares be cause for concern? After all, most competition/antitrust authorities, including for example the EU's, normally take a market share over 50% to be indicative of a dominant position. There are two distinct issues in assessing whether there is cause for concern: first, the search market might still be competitive even in situations where one company (or a few companies together) has/have a very large market share.
Second, even if the market is not competitive (in the extreme case a monopoly), given the structure of the search market and, in particular, the zero charges to search users, this might not be detrimental to overall social welfare -in fact the existence of a monopoly might even be welfare improving. 27 Clearly, neither of these questions can be adequately addressed without developing a more detailed analysis. And so it is to this task that we now turn.
26 This source of data differs from that found in the likes of Nielsen's NetRatings, comScore's MediaMetrix.
Those products get their data from the users themselves (directly or indirectly via ISPs) rather than from websites they visit. In this sense they may be more reliable sources of data. However, it has proved difficult to obtain continuous time-series data for these providers for more than a couple of years -and for that period the trend they show is very similar to that found in the data shown. 27 We shall discuss this point in more detail below so here we confine ourselves to pointing out that the search market is R&D intensive and so classic Schumpeterian arguments could be made that increased concentration will have a positive effect on R&D and hence on overall social welfare. 
Modelling the Search Engine Market
4.1. Introduction. The search engine market has certain distinctive features related to structure, costs and pricing, which must be central to any modelling exercise. We discuss each of these in turn.
The structure of the search engine market is displayed schematically in Figure 2 . As can be seen it has a basic '3-sided' aspect in which the search engine acts as a 'platform' intermediating between 'content providers' (who want 'users'), 'users/searchers' (who want 'content'), and 'advertisers' (who want access to 'users'). Closely related to this structure of connections between agents is the associated pricing (and supply) structure -also illustrated in the Figure. The first significant fact about pricing is that the primary 'content' input for search engines -the underlying information on the web -is provided for 'free'. That is, because of the history and tradition of the Web (and the Internet), search engines have generally been permitted access to this content at no charge -after all most information posted publicly on the web is already free for anyone to look at, and in addition, search engines can help increase traffic to a website.
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The next major fact, and equally important, is that search engines do not directly charge users for their service but supply it for 'free'. 29 In our model below we shall take this as an assumption and we therefore think it worthwhile to discuss the likely reasons for this here, especially as unlike 'content', this outcome must be the result of conscious choice by search engines.
First, the use-value of a search engine (the value of a query) is likely to be very heterogeneous (both across users and time) and hence may be difficult to price 'well'. Second, and more importantly search engines are essentially (meta-)information providers supplying users with information about where other information is located. Hence, charging for their service (i.e. charging users for queries) would suffer from all the classic Arrovian difficulties, most prominently that the value of a given query is often highly uncertain 28 Though like all other generalisations this is not completely true. First some websites have wished to restrict access to search engines, either because of concerns about caching and reuse or out of a desire to be remunerated by search engines (see e.g. Copiepress v. Google http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic. php?story=20070726152837334).
It is also the case that search engines can impose very significant load burdens on websites when they 'crawl' them. This was particularly so in the early days of the web but even today search engines crawlers can easily account for a very substantial portion of total traffic -one of the authors has personal experience of this and has actually restricted search engine access to parts of a site he helps maintain precisely because the performance hit caused by search engine 'crawls'. 29 Some search engines do in fact sell their search facility for use on corporate intranets etc but this provides a small percentage of their revenue.
before it is performed. 30 Third, and related to the previous two points, is that charging users would necessitate significant transaction costs on two main counts. First, in relation to administration of charges (processing and payment). Second in maintaining an effective exclusion regime which prevented those who had not paid for use for gaining access, directly or indirectly, to the search engine's search results. Fourthly, and finally, search engines have an alternative method to direct charging for generating revenue from users:
selling users' 'attention' (and intentions), generated via the use of the search facility, to advertisers.
It is worth emphasizing that this last point is central to the explanation of zero usercharges for without this (extremely effective) alternative method for raising revenue there would have been no option but to charge users directly -whatever the drawbacks of this approach. It also rounds out the details of the charging structure by making clear that advertisers are the one group out of the three whose interaction with the search engine has a financial component.
In discussing why search engines do not charge users we have not explicitly excluded the possibility that the search engines could pay for users to use their search engine either directly or indirectly. For example, a search engine could pay to ensure they were the default search option in a web browser, 31 or a search engine could even pay users directly for the searches they perform. 32 However, the scope for paying just as for charging seems fairly limited, at least at the present. The reasons are similar to the question of charging -transaction costs related to monitoring and payment, uncertainty as to the (advertising) value of a user etc. Thus, rather than saying that search engines cannot charge it is perhaps more accurate to say that search engines cannot set prices (whether positive or negative) but rather are constrained to price at zero.
30 There is also the additional problem here that the value of a given query may well depend on the ability to perform other ones in complicated ways. Formally, some queries will be complements and other substitutes and this may vary across users in ways which are difficult to predict. 31 This approach has, in fact, already been adopted with Google sharing ad-revenue with the Mozilla Foundation in exchange for Google being the default search engine in the Firefox browser (it is also reported that Yahoo! have entered into a similar deal with a competing Gecko-based browser named Flock). 32 Users might start auctioning their 'attention' to the highest bidder in the same way that search engines auction it to advertisers. Perhaps, more plausibly given how diffuse users are, one might imagine that intermediaries would enter (perhaps ISPs could take this role) who would locate themselves between users and the search engine and would charge search engines a fee for directing their user base to one search engine or another.
The last significant feature of the search engine market to mention relates to technology and costs. In particular, search engines are R&D intensive and the market generally displays high levels of innovation and obsolescence. 33 In addition, running a search engine service, quite apart from any R&D, is highly capital intensive. That is providing the hardware, support, monitoring etc to keep a search engine running, responsive and upto-date requires a very significant investment, quite apart from any spending on R&D in order to improve the service. Both of these types of cost, whether related to R&D or the development and maintenance of service infrastructure, are largely fixed. At the same time the marginal cost of serving one additional user (or advertiser) is very low (almost zero in fact), especially when compared to these fixed costs. Taken Stahl (2007)). However, at least under the present charging structure, the search engine business does not fit comfortably within this paradigm. In particular, the two primary groups a search engine sits between are 'users' and 'content providers' neither of whom pay to participate, while it is a third group 'advertisers' who pay to participate. 34 This means that the central concern of a two-sided model, namely the pricing structure, is rather secondary since a price is only set for one of the three groups, and that, furthermore, with least relevance to the two-sided framework.
33 For example, Microsoft claimed to be spending over $1bn a year on its online services (including its search engine) in 2006 (http://www.cbronline.com/article_news.asp?guid= 3D810B1B-BBE0-482D-A81C-DBE60BAB97C4). 34 Note here that 'advertisers' advertise on the search engine not on any content provider. Most search engine companies are also active in the 'ad-brokerage' market for reasons of economies of scope -selling advertising 'space' on search results also provides you with the tools (and customer base) to sell advertising 'space' on general sites. Furthermore, 'ad-brokerage' does fit well within the two-sided model since here the two sides ('content providers' and 'advertisers') do care about the size of the other group and the 'adbroker' naturally takes a platform role. However, here we are going to focus exclusively on search engine provision and will ignore related (and significant) business activities, such as those related to large-scale 'Ad-Brokerage'.
Instead it will be more useful to utilize the standard toolkit on oligopolistic competition, particularly models of Bertrand competition and vertical product differentiation Shaked and Sutton (1983); Sutton (1991). As we shall see this immediately provides some simple predictions (convergence to monopoly) which seem borne out by current data -though we will also discuss why the model is unlikely to fit exactly. Having established this, in following sections we discuss the implications of monopoly for social welfare and regulation.
4.2. A Formal Model. There are four types of agents in our model: 'users' (U), 'advertisers' (A), 'content providers' (C), and search engines (S). We start with some basic assumptions which help simplify the analysis and allow us to concentrate on the key areas of concern:
(1) The pool of material made available by 'content providers' is available to all search engines and is available for free. As such, 'content providers' can be ignored as (strategic) agents in this model leaving us to focus solely on the other three types. interval [a, b] and indexed by t (without loss of generality we may take a = 0, b = ∞ and thereby map potential users one to one the positive real line). A user's utility from using search engine i is given by:
It is assumed that utility is increasing in quality for all users -u(t, v i , p i u ) is increasing in v for all t. Note also that the form chosen implicitly assumes that there is no variation in the valuation of quality across search engines -that is users just care about the level of quality not which search engine it is associated with (note, however, that quality may of course be valued differently by different users). Let q i u be the total user demand for search engine i. The user's outside option will be normalized to 0 and users use the search engine which delivers the highest utility. Thus, q i u equals the set of t such that U i t ≥ 0 and U i t > U j t for all other search engines j. Thus formally q i u is a set, however when no ambiguity arises, we may equate it with the measure of this set, i.e. the total number users using search engine i. Finally, note that search engine user demand, q i u , will be a function of own quality, v i and of price, p i u as well as all the qualities and prices of other search engines:
. At this point we make a major assumption which reflects the current pricing structure of the search engine market and will help greatly simplify our analysis: Assumption 1. Search engines do not charge users:
Thus, utility becomes U i t = u(t, v i ) and user demand for search engine i becomes q i u (v i , v −i ). It will also be useful, for notational convenience, to drop the search engine index i except where it is absolutely necessary for clarity. Thus, U t = u(t, v) etc.
Having established the basic user model we now turn to advertising. Advertising will be modelled using a reduced form approach as follows. First let the advertising revenue generated by user t at search engine i be denoted by a(t, v i , q i u ) -which becomes a(t, v, q u ) without the i index. Total advertising revenue at search engine i is then given by the sum 36 A specific form that is similar to that used in the vertical differentiation literature would be
u where kt is a user specific cost of using the engine, p i u is the price charged by search engine i to users and θt = θ(t) is user-specific value for quality (assumed, wlog, to have θ > 0).
of this revenue across all users of that search engine:
The total costs of a search engine are a function of quality, the number of users and the amount of advertising: C = C(v, q u , R A ) = C(v, q u , R A (v, q u ) =C(v, q u ). It will be useful to divide C up into two parts as C = c + c A where c = c(v, q u ) = C(v, q u , 0) are 'core' or 'user' costs and c A (v, q u ) =C − c are 'advertising' costs (i.e. those arising from managing 'advertisers'). We now make our second assumption that reflects our discussion in the introduction:
Assumption 2. 'Core/user' costs are primarily fixed. In particular the marginal cost of an additional user is approximately zero. Furthermore, the cost of supplying a given quality is (up to a point) independent of the number of users.
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Putting together the cost function and the revenue function we have that profits are given by:
Before proceeding to the results of the next section it is worth making some observations. First, interpret q u as a scalar which (taking other search engine qualities as constant) is a function of v.
38 We can then invert and take v as a function of demand v = v(q u ). Then definingp(q u ) = R A (q u )/q u we have:
Note that this now looks like a classic vertical product differentiation problem in which p now represents the price charged to a user (here it is the derived price of a user in terms of advertising revenue). However there are some major differences, in particularp(q u )q u 37 Recall that quality has several components. Pure search results quality is essentially a nonrival good and therefore has absolutely zero marginal cost across users (the costs of producing algorithm to make the index and rank results are one-off). However the costs of maintaining the search service and keeping it responsive to users may have a greater marginal component -while costs of IT equipment and maintenance still have significant fixed costs there is a point at which increasing demand necessitates installing new servers, buying more bandwidth etc. 38 Strictly speaking qu is a set not a scalar. However, it could also be interpreted as the measure of this set (and hence a scalar) as long as we are careful -in particular by requiring that the increase in size arose from taking strict supersets (one may have the case of two sets of 'users' A, B with |A| > |B| but because of its composition of B being more valuable).
is guaranteed to be always increasing in q u and it does not make sense to consider q u as a function ofp. Furthermore, users do not choose on the basis of price but on the basis of quality so there is no complementarity between quality and price (this would only occur here if one allowed the amount of advertising to negatively impinge on demandin that case q u would implicitly come to depend onp). Specifically, as we assume that users are homogeneous in their taste for quality, our first assumption has converted the general vertical differentiation model into something very similar to a classic Bertand setup with firms competing on quality instead of price (and higher quality being preferred by consumers rather than lower price).
Market Structure
In this section we formalize some the intuitive arguments above regarding search market structure. Our basic result is that monopoly, or near-monopoly, is the likely outcome given cost and pricing structure of search. We supplement this formal result with an extensive discussion.
Proposition 3. User's will only use the search engine(s) with the maximum quality.
Proof. User t derives utility from search engine i:
Thus, their utility from search engine i is greater than from j if, and only if, search engine i has higher quality and this holds independent of t:
Hence, any users (who is maximizing utility) will use only search engines with maximum quality, i.e. whose v satisfies v ≥ v j , ∀j.
In the case where several search engines offer this maximum quality we need to specify how market demand is divided. The simplest approach is to assume that all demand configuration are equally like which implies that each of these search engines has equal (expected) revenue. To avoid trivial cases we shall also make the following assumption:
Assumption 4 (Basic profitability conditions). (a) firms with zero quality are inactive and earn zero profits (b) if there is only firm active, at least for one quality level v > 0 that firm can earn non-zero profits (i.e. it is profitable to supply search in the absence of competition from other firms).
Proposition 5. Assuming continuity of costs in quality there is no (Nash) equilibrium in pure strategies of this simultaneous quality choice game.
Proof. Let v be the maximum quality offered by a search engine. We must have v > 0 (if not some firm can profitably deviate). Since provision of quality is costly for a search engine no search engine will offer quality in (0, v) since they could either deviate to 0 or v and be strictly better off.
Assume that more than one search engine offers this top quality v > 0. Both must have non-zero market shares (if not then the one with zero market share must be making a loss since quality incurs a non-zero cost). Assume, first that quality can be varied continuously in costs, i.e. for any δ > 0 there exists and such that a firm can spend less than δ but increase its quality by . By 'deviating' in this way one of the firms can offer quality v + and thereby obtain complete market share with cost less than δ. Since for any quality increase above zero (and hence for ) the gain in market share is equal to the combined market share of all other firms it is bounded below (at a level above zero). As (advertising) revenue is increasing in market share, then the gain in income from advertising is bounded below by some amount A > 0. Choosing an and δ such that δ < A we have that such a deviation is profitable and hence no equilibrium can exist in which more than one firm offers a non-zero quality.
Thus one firm offers non-zero quality v and garners all of the market. Let v 0 be the maximum quality such that the firm makes zero profits. Suppose this firm chooses v < v 0 then another firm could enter with v ∈ (v , v 0 ) and obtain positive profits (so not a NE). Thus, firm must offer v 0 . But, given that other firms are offering v = 0 this firm could deviate to another v and obtain positive profits and so this cannot be a NE either.
QED.
Remark 6. This problem is very similar to the problem of a R&D race with deterministic discovery functions.
This non-existence result is largely the artefact of the strict simultaneity of moves and the discontinuity of payoffs it creates. It therefore makes sense to vary the setup by allowing one firm to 'move first' (a Stackelberg approach). We then have: Proposition 7. When one firm moves first (the leader) there is a single (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium in which the leader offers a non-zero quality v and is the only search engine in use. All other search engines offer a zero quality level and have no users. The single active firm makes zero profits.
Proof. One proceeds exactly as in the previous proof except that if the leader offers v 0 the threat of subsequent entry means that deviation is not a best-response and hence this is a Nash equilibrium.
5.1. Discussion. Clearly, in reality, the situation is rarely this simple and the result is rarely this stark. On the one hand, even with a very dominant firm, there are likely to be some other firms active in the market -i.e. a pure monopoly outcome is unlikely, 39 and it would therefore be better to interpret this result not as predicting absolute monopoly but simply a single highly dominant firm. On the other hand, though there is monopoly, there is also 'strong' contestability in the sense that the active (monopoly) firm is constrained by the threat of competition to make zero profits and (associatedly) to supply the maximum feasible quality. Both predictions are central to any discussion on the competitiveness of the search market into the future. It is therefore important to consider how robust they are; in particular to evaluate whether they flow from a particular aspect of the formalism (e.g. the use of one-shot Stackelberg) or reflect deeper features of the general environment.
We shall discuss each of these two items in turn.
5.1.1. Dominance. It is first worth recalling the main factors driving our formal result:
(a) a cost structure which involves high fixed costs (for quality) and low marginal costs (serving additional users) 40 (b) pure quality competition for users (i.e. zero prices and no user heterogeneity). In our view, any model which shares these basic features is likely to feature very high levels and a single dominant firm.
39 This is relevant to the empirical fact that today, though there may be one firm has very large proportion of the market, there are still other firms active. 40 Recall that this cost structure arises from two distinct aspects of the search engine model: economies of scale in the supply of the service itself, and the fixed costs of R&D. We have not distinguished these explicitly in our modelling since both contribute to the overall 'quality' of the experience.
In particular, high fixed cost/low marginal costs alone would imply a concentrated market. After all, as noted earlier, this cost structure is very similar to that of a classic 'natural monopoly' utility -a comparison that is all the more noteworthy given the basic, and crucial, infrastructural role that search engines play in the nascent 'information society'.
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This existing tendency to concentration is then reinforced by the pricing structure: with a zero price, competition for users (and hence advertisers) takes the form of a winner-takesall competition. It is this lack of competition on price that differentiates the current setup from the classic vertical differentiation models (see e.g. Shaked and Sutton (1983) ; Sutton (1991)) in which firms choose both quality and price. However it is noteworthy that those models, even with this price flexibility, often predict significant concentraction, especially when quality (and the associated fixed costs) are 'endogenous' (as is the case, for example, with R&D and advertising).
Of course it is important to note the implicit assumption here would be that there is a single (overall) 'quality' attribute which all users value positively (and that this was the only attribute differing across search engines). In reality, it is likely that there is some degree of heterogeneity across users. Brand preference is one obvious, though slightly nebulous, form of such heterogeneity. Another possibility would be that search engines specialize in searching a particular kind of content. 42 However, any such heterogeneities are likely be fairly limited compared to the general, homogenous, preference for 'quality'
and, as such, unlikely to change the basic property of the existence of a single dominant firm.
43 5.1.2. Contestability. Thus, it is not surprising that the search engine market is already concentrated, and growing more so. However, might it still be competitive? As discussed in our model, the (credible) threat of entry means that although there is a single firm it behaves rather like it would under competition. Here, even though the fixed costs are 41 Just as access to, say, electricity is now considered essential, at least in most 'developed' countries, so we can imagine that, soon, access to the Internet and, therefore, to a search engine, will be an equally essential requirement. 42 For example, it is argued that part of Sogou and Baidu's popularity come from their provision of a specific 'MP3-search' facility that allows users to easily search for music files on the Internet (most of which will be unauthorised copies -which perhaps explains the unwillingness of other search engines to emulate them). 43 However, adding such 'minor' heterogeneities would allow the model to become more realistic by predicting the existence of several small, fringe firms.
large, because the game is static and deterministic, the threat of entry is credible. In reality, the market is dynamic with investments in quality (particularly those in R&D) being made sequentially. Thus, the question as to whether the dominant firm is insulated from the threat of competition by significant 'barriers to entry' is largely determined by how these dynamics interact with the large (sunk) fixed costs.
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Generally, the question will revolve around the degree to which an incumbent can credibly 'block' entrants. This in turn depends on a variety of factors. Two of the most important will be (a) the size (and 'sunkness') of fixed costs; (b) the degree of (non-price, non-quality) 'lock-in' to an incumbent due, for example, to switching costs or 'network effects'.
Let us take each of these issues in turn. First, fixed costs seem to be large and growing.
Most of the major players have R&D spending in excess of $500 million a year and the core infrastructure appears to be equally large. 45 Furthermore, most of these incurred costs will be sunk: hardware and infrastructure have limited resale value (obsolescence is high) and the results of R&D will be highly search-specific. Hence, it would appear that, not only are the costs of entry large and growing, but that, facing the threat of entry, an incumbent can credibly commit to be 'aggressive' -for example via heavy R&D spend to improve quality.
Coming to the second point we focus on switching costs. If switching costs are high then, even if an actual or potential competitor offers a better quality product, they will find it hard to obtain market share (rapidly). Note here that the question of switching costs applies both to users and to advertisers as both are needed for a search engine to be successful. That said, one would expect that, if users switched, it would not be hard to persuade advertisers to switch as well, so it seems reasonable to focus on the user-side switching costs.
At first glance it would appear that switching costs are very low. After all, a search engine user can switch to an alternative by simply visiting a different website. However, 44 For example, pursuing the analogy with the R&D literature, there are a variety of result (e.g. Harris and Vickers (1985) ) which show that in a multi-stage race when the 'leader' has a large enough advantage even though 'followers' may exist (or could enter) the 'leader' can ignore this threat and behave like an (uncontested) monopolist -obtaining, for example, non-zero profits. 45 This is also borne out by anecdotal evidence. At a 2007 round-table on search in Toulouse Francois
Bourdoncle of Exalead stated that today that the core code for a search engine was around 3 million lines and would take $20-100 million to develop -and of course this excludes the cost of actually running the service.
it is not clear that switching costs are as low as they appear. In particular, there may be substantial brand effects as well as user adaptation to the behaviour of a particular search engine.
On the first of these points, a recent paper by Jansen, Zhang, and Ying (2007) examined the impact of brand on the evaluation of search results and found a significant impact.
Specifically, they displayed an identical set of results through different 'branded' interfaces and elicited user evaluations of their quality ('relevance'). Despite using these identical results they found a 25% difference in rating across engines. Along similar lines, it is interesting to note that there is significant geographical variation in search engine shares. It is also important to note that an increasing number of users pursue fairly sophisticated query strategies, often refining (and refining again) their initial query if it fails to turn up what they are looking for. It seems likely (though not empirically tested to our knowledge) that refinement strategies are search engine specific. As such, switching to a different engine is likely to involve some re-learning costs as a user adapts to the different search strategy required by the different search engine. It is also noteworthy, that an increasing number of search engines offer some form of explicit or implicit personalization.
Such personalization, which could be used either to improve a user's search experience 46 It is also worth noting that Google should be considered the original 'first-mover' in most of the jurisdictions in which it has a lead despite not being the first to enter formally (see Table reftable -search-history for details) because all of the other companies to pre-date it in the search market either were not focused on search itself (for example Yahoo! was a directory) or fell out of contention before the importance of search (qua search) was recognized (most prominently Altavista). 47 For example it fits comfortably within the escalation models of Sutton, and in fact Sutton (1991 Sutton ( , 1998 provides a large variety of cases where 'random' advantages early on in an industry have played out into permanent long-term dominance.
or increase their value to advertisers, is clearly search engine specific. It therefore also leads to increased switching-costs. These points are obviously conjectural, however there is some empirical evidence that users display increasing 'loyalty' to search engines. For example a Jupiter Research study from 2006 48 looked at user behaviour when they did not find what they were looking for with their first query. They found that 41% tried again (compared to just 28% 4 years earlier in 2002). Of these 82% refined their query on their existing search engine and 18% switched engines whereas 4 years earlier only 68% stayed with their existing engine (and 32% switched).
5.1.3. Conclusion. To sum up, the monopoly (or near-monopoly) result seems reasonably robust to variations in the model structure given the underlying zero-user price/quality competition model of search. In addition, this result fits fairly well as first-order approximation as the current state of the search market in most jurisdictions (especially when dynamics are taken into account). However, the strong contestability result (and associated zero-profits outcome) is not likely to be very robust.
Thus, when examining the effect of monopoly it will seem reasonable to focus on the case where the monopolist has some degree of flexibility in choosing variables such as the level of quality (by contrast, in the basic model above the monopolist is constrained to offer the maximum possible level of quality). Furthermore, in a dynamic model this flexibility would be likely to grow over time, concomitantly with the growth in the investment needed to rival the incumbent's quality level (it is these existing, 'sunk', costs which form the barrier to entry/competition in this market). 49 Thus, in the next section, a fair degree of latitude will be assumed for the monopolist in regard of pricing and quality provision, 50 and our 48 Reported at http://searchenginewatch.com/showPage.html?page=3598011. 49 This contrasts with a more two-sided model such as that found in the operating systems market where the barrier to entry for the monopolist (Microsoft) is related to the existing (and therefore expected future) installed base on the two sides of the market (application providers and consumers). That said, it is possible that the search market may develop in the direction of a more platform-like, two-sided model if content owners become more active (and therefore restrictive) with regard to search engine crawls and usage of material, particularly as search engine seek to expand the pool of material they cover (consider, for example, efforts such as Google Books). In this case, the analogies with the activities of participants in other two-sided markets may become more noticeable. For example, just as Microsoft have made significant investments downstream to integrate into the 'applications/software' side of the market for the twin purposes of promoting consumer demand and controlling porting (see Pollock (2007) ) so we are likely to see increased activity by search engine firms to move into content ownership for analogous reasons (this is already partially occurring with Google's acquisition of YouTube, Yahoo!'s acquisition of Flickr etc). 50 If one needed to incorporate the impact of external competition, either actual or potential, this could be imposed in the form of a minimum quality level or the like.
attention will be on how the monopolist's choice of these variables affect consumer and societal welfare rather than on issues of market structure and market share.
6. Monopoly and Welfare 6.1. Monopoly. Having established the focus on the monopoly case we can make some simplifications. First, total demand q u can be interpreted as a simple scalar equal to the measure of users whose utility is positive (u(t, v) ≥ 0). It may be sometimes useful to invert the relationship q u (v) to obtain v as a function of q u . 51 Using this we then have:
The monopolist's profit maximization problem is then to choose the quality level v M that maximizes this function. We have that v M satisfies the following first order condition:
Where subscripts indicate partial derivatives (the A subscript on R has been dropped), indicates a total derivative, and c A is shorthand for c A (q(v)) =C −c (which is necessarily positive).
6.2. Welfare. The first step in analyzing welfare is to define a social welfare function W .
We proceed as follows: W = Utility of Users + Profits of Search Engine + Profits of Advertisers
Note that, following on from the previous section, we assume there is only one search engine. We have also implicitly assumed that consumer surplus and producer surplus are accorded equal value in the social welfare function. Such an assumption is reasonably standard but one could argue that the widespread and diverse set of users and the relatively concentrated ownership of most search engine companies might merit explicit 51 We will assume this relationship to be invertible so that we can write v(qu) though strictly all we have is qu is non-decreasing in quality.
distributional weights. We have not pursued this possibility but note that it would be relatively easy to introduce an explicit weighting into the analysis.
Our next step is to observe that users' utility, search engine profits and users' utility must all be inter-related. After all, when advertisers pay money to the search engine they must expect to recoup these funds in the form of more buyers or higher prices. Here we would like to avoid specifying in detail the form of the advertising market and the equilibrium conditions and thus we take a reduced form approach to connect advertising, search and users. First, recall that R A is the total revenue from advertisers accruing to the search engine (which is therefore also equivalent to total payments by advertisers), and R U the total additional revenue accruing to advertisers from users as a result of their advertising (that is revenue related to their advertising activities). Next let U A be the (gain in) utility users derive as a result of advertising. Then total advertising profits (in respect of the activities under consideration here) are Π A = R U − R A . Search profits are
Meanwhile total user utility is given by the combination of the utility from search 52 U S (v, q u ) = qu U t with the (net) utility from advertising U A − R U . With these formulations social welfare now has the form:
The final step is to specify U A , the impact of advertising on users' utility. Here there are three options which could be put under the classic headings of advertising as:
'Good': U A > 0. In this case advertising directly improves users' welfare, perhaps by enabling better matches between consumers and producers, reducing 'search' time, 53 or simply directly increasing the valuation of the good advertised.
'Bad': U A < 0. Advertising decreases consumer's utility, for example by reducing the quality of matches, or creating incentives for malicious behaviour.
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As before all superscript i indices used to index the search engine will be omitted as there exists only one search engine. 53 See for example, the arguments in Athey and Ellison (2007) . 54 See Edelman (2006 . As Edelman summarises: "Across all search terms we analyze, a Google ad is on average more than twice as likely to take a user to an unsafe site [one which installed spyware, adware and the like without fully informing the user] than is a Google organic link. At Ask, the difference is especially pronounced: Their sponsored results are almost four times as risky as their organic listings." Summed over all engines his data indicated that 'organic' results had 2.0% 'red-rated' sites and 1.1% 'yellow-rated' sites while for 'sponsored' results the rates were 6.5% and 2.0% respectively. Edelman goes on to give numerous examples of ways in which the sponsored results (adverts) on search engines may be substantially poorer than the organic results. To take one example: in May 2006 the top sponsored link 'Neutral': U A = 0. Advertising has a neutral effect on consumer's utility generating neither direct benefits nor direct costs. This would correspond to the classic case of advertising as a war of attrition in which all (advertising) rents are dissipated in competition (or, in this case, payments to the search engine).
With plausible arguments on both the 'good' and 'bad' sides our approach will be to compromise and adopt the neutral perspective in which U A = 0. While this is a convenient simplification we would point out that, obviously, a different assumption whether in the positive or negative direction could have a substantial impact on the overall welfare findings and this should be kept in mind by the reader. With this assumption, social welfare takes the final form:
Since advertising does not now enter the formulation for W except via c A it is immediate that we want c A = 0 ⇔ R A = 0. 55 Thus we reduce to:
Maximizing with respect to v we have the socially optimal level of quality v W solves:
6.3. How Optimal is Monopoly? The next step is to compare this search quality v, and usage q u , with that under monopoly as defined in equation (6.1):
for 'Skype' was download-it-free.com who, despite their name, charged $29 to download a copy Skype, a program that is supplied for free by its producer (skype.com -the first 'organic link for this search). He also discusses (see e.g. http://www.benedelman.org/news/012606-1.html) the possible incentives for search engines to behave in this way due to the large revenues that 'bad' sponsored links can generate. 55 This implicitly assumes the search engine could be directly funded by non-distortionary taxation. Clearly this is unlikely to be the case and therefore even a publicly provided search engine might want to use advertising if that were an efficient way to raise revenue (it might also be politically more palatable than raising taxes elsewhere). Nevertheless, the more general point that 'society' would choose a lower level of advertising than the search engine is likely to be robust. Furthermore, the fact that cA is zero will have no material impact on the remainder of the welfare analysis presented below (i.e. replacing the zero value for cA with the value for the monopolist will have no significant effects).
In particular we would like to know whether the quality level under monopoly is too high or too low compared to the socially optimal level (equivalently is search quality 'over-provided' or 'under-provided' under monopoly) .
One might thing this question is rather trivial. Consider the more traditional case where R denotes revenue arising from a traditional charging regime. In that case it would normal to assume certain specific relationships between utility U and revenue R. In particular when increasing quality v:
• The utility from an extra user t (U) would be larger than or equal to the revenue received by the monopolist (R).
• The effect on existing users would be greater for utility (U v ) than for revenue (R v ).
Furthermore, with a 'normal' assumption of diminishing returns to quality, these functions are decreasing in v. Together with the fact that:
These would imply that v W ≥ v M , that is that the monopolist under-provides search quality (analogously to, but for slightly different reasons, to the way a monopolist undersupplies demand).
However, here this need not be the case. In particular the very fact that search engines choose not to charge users implies that the value that a search engine extracts from an additional user in terms of advertising revenues is higher than the price it could charge that same user, and higher even perhaps than the value of that query to the user. 56 In this latter case R q will be larger than U q and hence one could have, depending on the relative magnitude's of the direct effect of quality (
Similar effects would also obtain if, as is possible or even likely, revenue displays increasing returns in the number of users. 57 Increasing returns could occur for two distinct reasons. First, and most obviously, economies of scale involved in advertising on a search 56 Of course this is modulo transaction cost issues and the question as to whether a search engine could price discriminate among users as effectively as it can among advertisers. If not, then of course the search engine has the classic problem of all monopolists that it has to charge the same price to all which, depending on the distribution of user values, may not be very attractive. Search engines also has the problem that it is selling information (the query result) whose value is highly uncertain in advance. As a result users may be unwilling to pay in advance and it is difficult to extract payment ex-post. Nevertheless, and in spite of these caveats, the basic point that the value a search engine extracts from advertisers per user may be more than that user's query value still stands. 57 And even if charges are, say, per click-through or per-view.
engine, for example those that would arise from a fixed cost in generating or placing an advert, would lead to advertising demand increasing showing increasing returns to the number of search engine users. Second, economies of scope in advertising, arising, for example where an advertiser wishes to carry out several (related) campaigns each targeting different types of users and/or queries, would also lead to advertising demand displaying increasing returns in the number of users.
In both cases, one has that revenue has increasing returns in the number of users. It further follows that, Ris, at least over some portion of its domain, increasing in quality rather than decreasing. This in turn means that, not only might revenue be increasing in v, but that (total) marginal revenue R may be larger than total marginal utility, U , and hence that the monopolist's quality v M may be greater than the socially optimal level v W .
Illustrations of these two basic cases are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 . The two models are exactly the same except for the advertising revenue function. In the first case this is simply a linear function of users while in the second the revenue function is increasing (R ∼ q 2 ) and then decreasing (R ∼ q 1/2 ) in the number of users. In the first figure, as would be expected from the previous discussion, the monopoly quality is lower than the welfare maximizing quality. In the second figure, by contrast, the monopoly quality is higher than the welfare maximizing quality, illustrating the point that if advertising revenue displays increasing returns to users the monopolist may oversupply quality. 58 6.3.1. Total Utility and Quality. Having just explored how the way advertising revenue depends on users we should now turn to the other main functional associations: the relationship of total utility to quality and users (U = U v +U), and revenue's dependence on quality R v .
Improving search quality increases both the utility of existing users (U v > 0) and the demand for search (as new queries become feasible) U> 0 . In the case of utility, unlike for revenue, it seems reasonable that the demand effects display classic diminishing returns, i.e. Uis increasing in quality but at a decreasing rate. However, U v may display increasing returns in v even when the direct effect (U vv ) is negative, if the result the cross 58 Note that in this case, unlike in the first one, whether oversupply occurs will depend on the parameters.
That is, even with increasing returns if the increasing returns in users are weak (or demand diminishes sharply in quality) then it will still be the case that the monopoly quality is less than the socially optimal quality. term, U vq , is positive enough -
Thus, it is possible that U itself displays increasing returns to quality, at least over some portion of the quality range.
59 It is also not impossible, though perhaps less likely, that Uvv itself is positive, at least for low levels of v.
To illustrate this, we provide two concrete examples in which search quality affects utility by reducing the cost of search (leaving the value of given search constant). Recall first that the individual user utility function is u (t, v) and, that with definition of q(v) as the solution of u(q, v) = 0, we have :
•
. Intuition: each user (query) has a constant value k but a variable cost of performance (to the user) which is increasing in t and diminishing in quality v. Demand also displays diminishing returns:
user there are diminishing returns to quality and these are sufficiently strong that total utility still displays diminishing returns:
). Intuition: each user (query) has an increasing value but also increasing costs. Costs are reduced by search quality. One could think of this situation as a case where queries are of increasing complexity with both the value and costs increasing (quadratically and cubically here) in that complexity.
Demand, q(v) is the same as before but now
(1 + v) 1.5 , which displays increasing returns to quality.
As these examples show, there can be a fairly subtle interplay between demand and the value of quality, and the overall effect can be to make total user utility display either increasing or decreasing returns to quality. It should also be clear that there is no necessary reason for utility and revenue to be closely connected in any way. In particular, investments in quality which improve the net value of existing queries, for example by reducing their cost as in these examples, would be unlikely to have any effect on demand for advertising (if anything, and as we are about to discuss, they are likely to reduce ad-revenue). If this is so, then it increases the likelihood that the socially optimal level of quality exceeds that provided by the monopolist. 6.3.2. The Direct Effect of Quality on Revenue. Finally, we come to the question of quality's direct effect on the monopolist's revenue from advertising: R v . As already discussed, it seems obvious that the indirect effect of quality on revenue, via an increase in the user base, is positive. However the direct effect, we would argue, is likely to be negative. This is for two reasons which we label the 'substitution' and the 'antagonism' effects.
The substitution effect arises from the fact that 'ads' can be seen as a method of helping consumers search. For example if you search for 'shoes' or, even more explicitly, 'buy shoes', it may actually be useful for advertisements related to shoes, and purchasing shoes, to be displayed. In this case, 60 if a search engine is able to display 'ads' relevant to users' search intentions, it is highly likely that the search engine is also able to display organic search results that are relevant. In this case, the advertisements and the search results are substitutes in the sense that better search means less need to click on advertisements (and vice versa). As such, improving search quality, by improving the search results the user receives for a given query, must necessarily reduce the likelihood of the user clicking on the advertisements ('sponsored' links) presented alongside. Conversely, worse search quality actually increases the likelihood, for a given search, that a user clicks on an ad rather than an 'organic' result. The effect also operates from the opposite, 'advertisers' direction. If a search engine had such amazing quality that whenever one was looking to 'buy shoes' the 'good' places to buy shoes were presented as the top search results there would be much less reason to advertise. 61 However if the search engine does not present that information then it will necessary for companies to advertise, and, once again, an increase in search quality reduces advertising revenue (and vice-versa).
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The second, 'antgaonism', effect, arises from the fact that, for a given query, search results may, by providing information that is 'antagonistic' to an advertiser, reduce the advertising revenue for that query. For example, consider the following hypothetical example in which there is a query for 'vitamin supplements' which generates both 'organic' search results as well as advertisements to firms which supply such supplements. Suppose (this is hypothetical), that there is new research out that demonstrates that such supplements are of no value (or even harmful). Displaying such a result high up (perhaps at the top of the search results) may increase quality for users but may well reduce the likelihood a given user clicks on advertisement. As such by making this information prominent one reduces the amount of advertising revenue generated from that query.
60 See e.g. Athey and Ellison (2007) for explicit argument for this approach.
61 If the company is good you are already in the list and if it is bad there is no point advertising as users will know, ipso facto, it is bad. 62 There are some suggestions that over time Google have downgraded search results which of are an explicitly commercial nature. Of course this could simply be to get rid of 'spam' or overly commercial information. However, as just discussed, it also forces those commercial organizations to buy advertising. Even outside of the commercial sphere it appears this approach is taking hold: it was recently reported that a UK Government department ended up buying Google keyword advertisements as they found this was a more effective way of getting information to potential users than relying on the 'organic' search results themselves.
Together these two effects imply that the direct impact of quality on a search engine's revenue is negative: R v < 0. Of course, search quality also has an indirect impact via increasing the number of users/queries. Furthermore, it is likely that this effect is larger than the direct one: |R| > |R v |. Thus, overall it is still very likely that revenue is increasing in search quality, R = R v +R> 0, as the effect of better quality in increasing queries outweighs any effect of quality in reducing revenue per query. Nevertheless, this is in contrast with the case of social welfare and users' utility where quality's direct impact (U v ) is strongly positive, and this is therefore one major reason to suppose that a private search engine will under-provide quality.
We can summarize the above discussion in the following 'proposition':
Proposition 8. It is more likely that the monopolist's under-supplies quality relative to the socially optimal level:
• The smaller the advertising revenue from new users (R q ) compared to the social value of new users (U q ) (this is just the classic social-private gap).
• The greater the positive effect of quality on the utility of existing users: U v (this increases the socially optimal level but leaves the monopoly level unchanged).
• The greater the (negative) direct ('substitution' and 'antagonism') effect of quality on the monopolist's revenue: R v (this decreases the monopolist's chosen quality but leaves the socially optimal level unchanged).
Overall, it is likely, in our view, that the under-provision effect dominates. First, the indirect effect of search engine quality on utility is likely to grow at least as fast, if not faster, than its effect on revenue (so U q > R q ). Second, the direct effect of quality on utility is likely to positive (and substantial) while the direct on revenue will be negative. Third, and least importantly, search engines have to bear advertising related costs which increase their costs compared to the direct funding case and therefore reduce the quality provided.
The first of these effects is just the classic 'social-private' gap: the benefits of an extra unit of search quality to society are less than those extracted (in the form of advertising revenues). The second of the effects, which has already been discussed at length, arises from the fact that, for those users a search engine already has, quality acts as substitute for advertising (which is what the search engine is ultimately concerned with). Note that this second effect, unlike the first one, is not a general one but is likely to primarily affect quality in areas where it is more directly antagonistic to, or a substitute for, advertising.
Thus, it is likely more to 'distort' quality rather than unilaterally reduce it and for this reason we term it the 'distortion' effect.
Regulation
Does Internet search require regulation -whether now or in the future? Search today is a huge business and the choices made by the primary companies involved, particularly in how to rank results and what adverts to display, affect the lives of everyone who uses the Internet. While some argue that search requires no regulation -and that any such regulation would unnecessarily impede the rapid technological progress of the industry;
others have voiced concerns both about the informational integrity of search engines and the potential misuse of the vast power accumulating in commercial hands -a power to shape the information we discover and use. Clearly one cannot address every single one of the concerns that have been voiced in a single paper such as this. However, we have been able to provide a parsimonious framework which allows us to address many of the main issues in a simple but rigorous way.
In particular, we have demonstrated why the search engine market is so concentrated and why it is likely to become more so (converging to monopoly or almost monopoly). It therefore seems unlikely that one can simply rely on 'competition' to avoid the need for regulatory engagement.
Once explicitly considering a monopoly (or close-to-monopoly) situation, our next step, and the more important from a regulatory point of view, was to investigate whether, and how, a monopolist will behave in ways that are not socially optimal. This investigation is doubly important here. The structure of the search market, in particular the zero price faced by search engine users, often gives the misleading impression that a monopoly in the search engine market cannot result in negative consequences in same way as in other areas -areas where monopoly is explicitly associated with higher prices. This is not correct.
Costs still exist here but they are indirect, operating either via the search engines charges to advertisers or via the quality of the service the search engine chooses to operate.
The model presented allowed us to reduce welfare comparisons to a comparison of search engine quality, v. It was shown that monopoly could result in both over provision and under provision of quality. However, as discussed, it is likely that the under-provision effect dominates. This was primarily attributable to two main factors: the 'social-private' gap and the 'distortion' effect.
What can a regulator can do with regard to the first of these factors, the 'socialprivate' gap? In some ways the options are limited. After all they cannot mandate higher expenditures by private search engines and while government subsidies are a possibility they tend to bring with them a host of difficult issues: who should be awarded money;
could such awards be anti-competitive if directed to a particular firm etc. If this route were to be pursued one would probably need to focus on funding basic R&D which was then made available to all firms.
Another possibility, along similar lines, but which avoids some of the difficulties, would be the provision of a computing grid and search index upon which developers could try out different algorithms. This option points towards the fact that the provision of a search engine divides (imperfectly) into what we could term the 'software' provision and the 'service' provision. The 'software' includes all the main software used to run the system, including the ranking algorithm. The 'service' side involves all the infrastructure, datacentres, support systems etc, which run the software and actually respond to users' queries.
Obviously there is some degree of interaction between these two -for example developing the software requires feedback and data from actual usage, but it is also possible that the two sides could be separated to some degree. This is important because the costs involved in algorithm development could be much smaller than the large fixed costs of infrastructure -though in the long run it may be the algorithm, extensively developed via learning-bydoing etc, that provides the real barrier to entry. Thus, decoupling the two, might allow for greater competition, innovation, and perhaps most importantly, transparency on the 'software' side while on the 'service' side there remains a monopoly or near monopoly (provided by the Government or a neutral, regulated, third-party). This would be similar to a situation in many other industries where there exists a key piece of infrastructure which for technology and costs reasons is a natural monopoly. For example, in electricity supply, the underlying transmission network is a natural monopoly (and hence regulated) but competition is clearly possible in generation (and so less regulated). Similarly, in telecommunications it will be usual for the 'local loop' to be a natural monopoly (and hence regulated) but for there to competition in service provision (telephony, broadband etc) over that 'local loop'.
Such an approach in which there was a division, at least from a regulatory point of view, between 'software' and 'service' would have more general benefits than allowing targeted support. First, competition in 'software' would increase spending and therefore quality.
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Second, and relatedly, it would reduce the risk of long-term lock-in to a single provider.
Third, regulatory attention could be focused on the 'service' side which in many ways is simpler: economies of scale arise less from (field-specific) innovation and more from the sunk costs of infrastructure.
Turning now to the second factor mentioned, the 'distortion' effect, we observe that the 'software/service' division would also be beneficial by increasing transparency and competition on the 'software' side. However, there are other ways of dealing with this problem without taking such a major step. 'Distortion' could be handled, for example, by greater monitoring of search results and their relation to advertisements. Relatedly, the regulator could request confidential access to the search engine's ranking algorithm and could also act as a review panel for those who wish to 'appeal' their ranking. 64 Similarly, such a regulator might also monitor the other, advertising side of search engine activities, not only in the area of advertising content but also in relation to issues such as click-fraud.
To sum up, there are both the grounds and the means for greater regulatory oversight of search engines' activities -be such oversight formal or informal. There are a variety of ways such regulatory intervention could proceed. The most major, but also perhaps the most effective, would involve dividing search engine provision, whether conceptually or actually, into two separate 'software' and 'service' components. Less dramatically, it seems clear that, as the power of search engines grows, there will be a increasing need for independent monitoring of the quality and content of search engine results together with a body able to deal with complaints regarding search engine rankings. 63 We would move back towards the high-quality, zero-profits equilibrium. 64 At present all major search engines, while providing facilities with which to raise complaints, claim complete discretion in resolving any disputes over ranking. This is unlikely to prove sustainable into a future where search is increasingly important, powerful, and concentrated.
Conclusion
This paper has provided a comprehensive introduction and analysis of the search engine market. After a basic overview of the nature of search engines, their current importance, both commercially and socially, and their history we turned to the main empirical and theoretical questions that animate our investigation: the current and future market structure of the search engine market and its implications for societal welfare.
Our empirical material demonstrated how the concentration of the search engine market has grown over time and has now reached very substantial levels though with some significant and important variation across market segments. This also formed the background for the theoretical investigations that followed and which form the core of this paper.
This theoretical work provides what is, to our knowledge, the first formal analysis of the wider search engine market and its welfare implications. 65 The first step involved developing a basic model which captured the main features of the search market, in particular the 'implied revenue' function which gives search engine revenue as a function of users. The value of a user here is not, as in a normal case, the revenue from a direct charge to that user but is the implied value arising from the advertising revenue that user generates. Following on from this, we showed how the structure of the search engine market, in particular that users care about quality but are not charged, while advertisers care about users and are charged, explains the highly concentrated nature of the search engine market and make it probable that the market will continue to evolve down this path towards monopoly.
Given this, our next step was to investigate the welfare performance of a monopoly, measured by the quality of search provided, as compared to the benchmark of the socially optimal provision. It was shown that a monopolist would deviate from optimal provision in a variety of ways and was likely to provide an inefficiently low search quality (and engage in 'distortion' of its organic results).
Given this it seems likely that some form of oversight, possibly including formal regulation, will become increasingly necessary. Part of this effort could include taking steps to encourage a more diverse search environment. However, the structure of the search 65 By contrast there has already been substantial work on particular aspects of search engines such as their methods for auctioning advertising space (see references in the main text).
market, in particular its great economies of scale, may undermine the potential for, and benefits of, vigorous market competition, especially in the long run. When monopoly, or near monopoly, does obtain it was shown that there is no guarantee that the private interests of a search engine and the interests of society as whole will coincide -and good reasons to think otherwise.
It is therefore likely that search, if left entirely unregulated, will develop in ways that are not always to the benefit of society as a whole. For this reason it is important that policy-makers start now on the process of developing their strategy in relation to this key area of the knowledge economy. The power rapidly accumulating in the hands of a few major search providers is a great one. It behoves to ensure that it is used in a way that brings the greatest benefit to society as a whole.
